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Comment on Whistling Loud and Clear: 
Applying Chevron to Subsection 21F of 
Dodd–Frank 
Sarah C. Haan* 
I. Introduction 
On February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Digital 
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers,1 resolving the circuit split at the heart 
of Shaun M. Bennett’s student Note, Whistling Loud and Clear: 
Applying Chevron to Subsection 21F of Dodd–Frank. In a 
unanimous decision, the Court concluded that the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s2 (Dodd–Frank) 
definition of “whistleblower” applied to the anti-retaliation 
provision in question in the case.3 Because Mr. Somers did not 
report his employer’s securities law violations to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before the company 
fired him, the Court decided, he lost his bid for retaliation 
protection under the Dodd–Frank Act.4 Somers is the second of two 
recent cases in which the Court has reviewed federal 
whistleblower retaliation protections. The first, Lawson v. FMR 
LLC,5 was decided in 2014 and interpreted whistleblower 
retaliation protections in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 20026 
                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I am grateful to Mr. Bennett and the Editorial Board of the Washington and 
Lee Law Review for inviting me to participate in the 2017 Washington and Lee 
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 1. No. 16-1276 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 3. Two concurrences were filed. One, by Justice Sotomayor, was joined by 
Justice Breyer. Somers, slip op. at 14. A second, by Justice Thomas, was joined by 
Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Id. at 15. They are discussed infra.  
 4. Id. at 8–9. 
 5. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). 
 6. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
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(Sarbanes–Oxley). Somers concerned a second set of whistleblower 
retaliation protections enacted as part of Dodd–Frank.7   
Together, Lawson and Somers reveal some important truths. 
First, as evidenced by the Court’s willingness to resolve two similar 
cases in four years, whistleblowing is a tremendously important 
subject. It has implications for systemic risk as well as for 
risk-monitoring and governance of firms. As I explain in Part VI, 
future cases may address the unique vulnerabilities of lawyers in 
whistleblowing situations, and tensions between lawyers’ 
professional responsibilities and employer/employee incentives 
under federal whistleblowing law.  
Second, Congress’s drafting of whistleblower protection 
provisions has been entirely inadequate to achieve the sort of clear 
incentives that facilitate whistleblowing as an activity. There has 
been a significant amount of confusion about who is covered by 
which protection, and under what circumstances. Somers clarifies 
one ambiguity, but there remain serious unanswered questions 
about how whistleblower incentives and protections work on the 
ground. Third, there is fundamental and sustained disagreement 
on the Court about how Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank should 
be interpreted. The justices disagree about whether it is 
appropriate to take into account Congress’s “intent” to protect 
investors, restore trust in capital markets, and “root out corporate 
fraud,”8 and about the specific value of Senate Reports as 
legislative history.  
II. Whistleblowing and the Economy 
As companies increasingly operate across borders, and 
technological and financial innovations create new, unregulated 
risks, whistleblowers offer unique protections to companies and 
shareholders. Scholars are only now recognizing the role that 
whistleblowers can play in preventing or reducing corporate 
wrongdoing, improving efficient capital allocation, and forcing 
private information into the public domain.9 In recognition of 
                                                                                                     
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 7. See generally Dodd–Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 8. Somers, slip op. at 4. 
 9. An excellent post-crisis summary of the promise of whistleblowing is 
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whistleblowers’ microprudential and macroprudential potential, 
Congress has passed two major pieces of legislation over the last 
fifteen years to encourage and protect whistleblowers. Sarbanes–
Oxley,10 enacted in 2002 after the Enron catastrophe, and Dodd–
Frank,11 passed after the 2008 financial crisis, both create 
whistleblower incentives and protections.  
There are differing views about the “structure” of our federal 
whistleblower protection regime, as evidenced by Somers. In his 
Note, Mr. Bennett offers a “structural” comparison of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley scheme and the Dodd–Frank scheme, and finds 
the two schemes independent and significantly different. This is 
not how the SEC viewed them; it interpreted the later Dodd–Frank 
Act to have built upon and borrowed from the Sarbanes–Oxley 
whistleblower provisions, and thus viewed the regulatory schemes 
holistically. In Somers, the Supreme Court chose neither side, and 
focused on differences between the whistleblower protection 
schemes.12  
In its briefs to the Supreme Court, the SEC argued that the 
Dodd–Frank Act whistleblower provisions should be understood as 
presenting a dual structure, with one set of provisions addressing 
the potentially million-dollar awards the SEC gives to 
whistleblowers, and the other set of provisions protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation.13 Most of the provision—
subsections (b) to (g), plus subsection (i)—concerns rewards.14 Only 
subsection (h) is about protection from retaliation.15 The SEC 
argued that the statutory definition of “whistleblower” in 
subsection 21F(a) was meant to limit the category of individuals or 
groups who can claim a cash award. According to the SEC, 
                                                                                                     
provided by Christine P. Skinner in Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 
N.C. L. REV. 861, 867–85 (2016). 
 10. See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 745. 
 11. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
 12. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276, slip op. at 4–7 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2018). 
 13. The SEC argued that this dual structure is supported by the title of the 
statutory provision, “Securities whistleblower incentives and protection.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
 14. Id. §§ 78u-6(b)–(g), (i). 
 15. Id. § 78u-6(h). 
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subsection (h), which offers retaliation protection, uses the word 
“whistleblower,” not in this narrow sense, but in its commonly 
understood meaning, to signify anyone who blows the whistle. The 
SEC contended that the law used the definition of “whistleblower” 
to narrowly cabin the group of individuals who could claim a 
reward, but the late-added section on retaliation protection did not 
need to be so narrowed, and in fact it expressly cross-referenced 
whistleblowing activity covered by Sarbanes–Oxley. The Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected this “structural” argument in Somers, 
and implicitly rejected the SEC’s holistic approach to the two 
statutes as well. 
The Enron debacle was, in many ways, the predictable result 
of a system with inadequate whistleblower protections. Sherron 
Watkins, an Enron executive, had attempted to blow the whistle 
on wrongdoing at the company and was treated savagely by 
Enron’s management, who forced her out. In acknowledgment of 
the role she could have played to prevent catastrophe, Time 
magazine named Ms. Watkins and two other whistleblowers 
“Persons of the Year” in 2002.16 Ms. Watkins’s late vindication was 
no comfort to Enron’s shareholders and employees, who suffered 
enormous losses when the company experienced a wave of 
accounting scandals, exactly as Ms. Watkins had forewarned. 
Unfortunately, Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower protection 
regime proved faulty just a few years later. In the lead-up to the 
2008 financial crisis, whistleblowers at Lehman Brothers raised 
concerns internally and were fired as a result.17  Yet excessive 
risk-taking and outright fraud continued unabated, resulting in 
the 2008 financial crisis and another round of lawmaking.  In 2010, 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act,18 which included a set of 
provisions designed to further enhance and protect whistleblowers.   
                                                                                                     
 16. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The 
Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,1003998,00.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
2, Somers, No. 16-1276 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2017). 
 18.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
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Dodd–Frank built on the Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower 
protection regime with something new: an award system of cash 
bounties.19 The cash awards reflect the high value of 
whistleblowing activity to our economy and were designed to 
incentivize more whistleblowing. The SEC has run with its 
authority to hand out cash awards to whistleblowers. In 2016, it 
awarded $57 million to a small group of whistleblowers, 
underscoring the scope of the economic harm these whistleblowers 
averted.20  The next year, awards totaling $50 million were divided 
among twelve whistleblowers.21 
As the years go by, the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank are reshaping the way whistleblowing 
works in corporate America, and incentivizing ethical conduct that 
also protects shareholder wealth. Thus, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the scope of federal whistleblower retaliation 
protections is critical to the nation’s economic health and to the 
health of individual corporations and banks in which Americans 
invest. 
III. Mr. Bennett’s Prizewinning Note 
In his prizewinning note, Whistling Loud and Clear: Applying 
Chevron to Subsection 21F of Dodd–Frank, Mr. Bennett attempts 
to resolve a circuit split between the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning 
our federal whistleblower protection regime.22 Unfortunately, in 
                                                                                                     
 19. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841–43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 76u-6 (2012)) 
(providing the guidelines for awards to whistleblowers following a covered judicial 
or administrative action). 
 20. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 5 (2017) [hereinafter SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2016]. 
 21. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2017) [hereinafter SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 22. See also Leonardo Labriola, Note, Paying Too Dearly for a Whistle: 
Properly Protecting Internal Whistleblowers, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2839, 2877 
(2017) (favoring a burden-shifting solution to the issues raised in Somers); Daniel 
Gilpin, Note, Hiding Behind the Veil of Ambiguity: Why Courts Should Apply the 
Plain Meaning of the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
851, 852 (2016) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of the circuit split is 
correct); Janna Mouret, Comment, Shelter from the Retaliation Storm, 52 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2015) (arguing that whistleblower protection under Dodd–
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Somers, the Court did not reach the Chevron issue discussed by 
Mr. Bennett because it determined that the Dodd–Frank provision 
was unambiguous. Although some of Mr. Bennett’s core points 
were not discussed by the Court in Somers, his Note provides 
important analysis on issues raised by the case. Mr. Bennett’s Note 
does a strong job of exploring the textual issues at play, and he 
identifies Chevron issues likely to arise in a future case. He also 
grapples with the policy implications of his conclusions, noting that 
a real-world consequence of the outcome he advocates may be that 
whistleblowers are discouraged from reporting internally first or 
perhaps even at all.23  Since the Supreme Court ultimately reached 
the result that Mr. Bennett advocated, his discussion of the policy 
implications takes on new importance. I very much appreciate the 
invitation to engage in a scholarly discussion about Mr. Bennett’s 
Note and our federal whistleblowing regime. 
IV. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers 
Like virtually all of the cases in which this issue has arisen, 
the whistleblower in Somers stumbled upon fraud at his company 
and, rather than calling the SEC, he reported it to his supervisors.  
Then, of course, rather than fixing the problem, the company fired 
him. He sued under Dodd–Frank, seeking to be reinstated to his 
job and compensated for his losses. There are a lot of these cases.  
The SEC handled over 4,200 reports from whistleblowers in 2016.24 
In 2017, that number increased to over 4,400.25 Although we lack 
data confirming the number of these whistleblowers who 
experienced retaliation from their employers, the number is 
probably not de minimus. 
Mr. Bennett argued—and the Supreme Court agreed—that in 
order to get any retaliation protection under the Dodd–Frank 
                                                                                                     
Frank “should extend to employees regardless of whether they report to the SEC 
or to their employer”). 
 23. But see Claire Sylvia & Emily Stabile, Rethinking Compliance: The Role 
of Whistleblowers, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 451, 452 (2016) (arguing that the view that 
a whistleblower reward program undermines internal reporting by 
whistleblowers is not supported by evidence). 
 24. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2016). 
 25. SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 1. 
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statute, a whistleblower must report directly to the SEC.  This is 
undesirable from the whistleblower’s point-of-view because 
whistleblowers generally feel allegiance to the company and do not 
want it to go down in the flames of public scandal. It is also 
undesirable from the corporation’s point-of-view. Companies do 
not want employees to take evidence of wrongdoing directly to 
regulators, circumventing the company’s internal controls. So 
Somers presented the rare case where the interests of 
whistleblowers and the interests of companies were more or less 
aligned in favor of incentivizing internal reporting. However, as 
Mr. Bennett skillfully points out, the fact that companies’ and 
whistleblowers’ interests would probably both best be served by 
incentivizing internal whistleblowing does not necessarily mean 
that Congress wrote a law that does that. The Supreme Court 
concluded that it did not. 
V. Lawson v. FMR LLC 
Questions about whistleblower retaliation are so significant, 
and arise so frequently, that the Supreme Court resolved a case 
about whistleblower retaliation under Sarbanes–Oxley just a few 
years ago, in 2014.  Like Somers, that case, Lawson v. FMR LLC,26 
was authored by Justice Ginsburg. In both Lawson and Somers, 
Justice Ginsburg emphasized the purpose of the federal 
whistleblower laws that the Court was interpreting—Sarbanes–
Oxley in Lawson, and Dodd–Frank in Somers. Congress enacted 
Sarbanes–Oxley “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and 
restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of 
Enron Corporation,” Justice Ginsburg wrote in Lawson.27 The 
Court’s resolution of the interpretation question in Lawson was 
based in part on “the mischief to which Congress was 
responding.”28 In Somers, Justice Ginsburg explained that 
Congress’s purpose in enacting both Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–
Frank was “to root out corporate fraud,”29 and she pointed out that 
                                                                                                     
 26. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). 
 27. Id. at 1161. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2018); see also id. at 5 (“Dodd–Frank responded to numerous perceived 
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Congress had authorized the SEC to issue rules “consistent with 
the purposes of this section.”30 
In Lawson, a divided court concluded that whistleblower 
retaliation protection under Sarbanes–Oxley extended not only to 
whistleblowers employed by a public company, but also to 
whistleblowers employed by the company’s contractors and 
subcontractors.31 Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion in Lawson 
was particularly attentive to the damage shareholders would 
sustain if the statute was given a crabbed interpretation.32   
In contrast, in Somers, the court unanimously held that 
whistleblower retaliation protection did not extend to a 
whistleblower who failed to disclose wrongdoing to the SEC. As Mr. 
Bennett urged it to do, the Court relied on the plain language of 
the definition of “whistleblower” in the definition section of the 
statute, subsection 21F(a). This defines the word to mean “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws to the Commission.”33 Mr. Bennett anticipated 
many of the arguments that the Supreme Court found persuasive. 
He considered the statutory definition in the context of Dodd–
Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. He noted that the word 
“whistleblower” is used in subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), the 
anti-retaliation provision, which proceeds as follows: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 
directly or indirectly or in any other manner discriminate 
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act . . . .34 
Mr. Bennett argued that it is appropriate to substitute every 
instance of the term “whistleblower” in Subsection 21F with the 
statutory definition of the term. To support the argument, he 
                                                                                                     
shortcomings in financial regulation. Among them was the SEC’s need for 
additional ‘power, assistance and money at its disposal’ to regulate securities 
markets.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 36–37 (2010))). 
 30. Id. at 6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012)). 
 31. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1161. 
 32. Id. at 1173. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 34. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
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quoted a dissenting judge in the Second Circuit case, who protested 
that “[t]he thing about a definition is that it is, well, definitional.”35 
Mr. Bennett’s argument is straightforward: when a term is 
defined in a statute, every use of the word must embody that 
definition. The Supreme Court did not adopt such a broad rule in 
Somers, but it reached Mr. Bennett’s suggested outcome, 
concluding that the statutory definition applied here. 
In his book Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 
Justice Scalia and his co-author, Bryan Garner, wrote that 
statutory “[d]efinitions are, after all, just one indication of 
meaning—a very strong indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one 
that can be contradicted by other indications.”36 Justice Scalia 
wrote separately in Lawson to object to the majority’s “excursion[]” 
into the legislative history of Sarbanes–Oxley37—he was joined 
only by Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia specifically challenged the 
majority’s use of a committee report as evidence of legislative 
intent, opining that “[m]any” of the members of one House of 
Congress “almost certainly did not read the report or hear the 
statement, much less agree with it—not to mention the Members 
of the other House and the President who signed the bill.”38  
In Somers, Justice Thomas made substantially similar 
arguments and was joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch.39 Thus, 
the band of justices who doubt the reliability of Senate Reports as 
evidence of Congress’s intent has grown, in four years, from two to 
three. 
VI. Lawyers and Whistleblowing 
The Supreme Court’s resolution of Somers raises at least one 
serious concern for the future. The Court’s narrow interpretation 
of “whistleblower” incentivizes companies to fire auditors and 
                                                                                                     
 35. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting). 
 36. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012). 
 37. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in principal part and concurring in the judgment). 
 38. Id. at 1177. 
 39. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., v. Somers, No. 16-1276, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2018) (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
574 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 565 (2018) 
lawyers who report wrongdoing internally, and to fire them 
quickly, before they can report to the SEC. Lawyers are under a 
professional obligation to protect a client’s confidential 
information, and can only report to the SEC as a last resort. Thus, 
a lawyer is uniquely vulnerable to retaliation in the period between 
her discovery of wrongdoing and her conclusion that she must 
reveal confidential information to “prevent substantial injury to 
the organization.”40 Throughout this period, the company can fire 
the lawyer with the knowledge that Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
retaliation protections have not kicked in. After the lawyer is fired, 
the lawyer likely cannot report wrongdoing to the SEC without 
violating the duty of confidentiality.41 
Practically, this means that Somers interprets Dodd–Frank in 
a way that creates serious tension between a lawyer’s professional 
obligations, his access to whistleblower protections under that law, 
and his employer’s power to make the problem go away by firing 
him. Although this may be an unfortunate consequence of a poorly 
written statute, it is hard to believe that employers will not take 
advantage of the Somers loophole. Because lawyers are some of the 
main actors we would expect to gain knowledge of potential 
wrongdoing, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower retaliation protection 
provisions create a cascade of thorny ethical questions for lawyers 
who learn of wrongdoing at their employers. These ethical 
dilemmas may effectively neutralize lawyers as advocates for 
internal change. If this is an outcome of Somers, Congress should 
act swiftly to fix it. 
VII. Conclusion 
Whistleblowers play a critical role in our economy. After 
Somers, our economy would benefit from better-written laws that 
encourage whistleblowing through both cash awards and 
                                                                                                     
 40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(c)(1)–(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 41. See id. r. 1.9(c) 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall 
not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit 
or require with respect to a client . . . or (2) reveal information relating 
to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client. 
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retaliation protection. However, a lawyer who learns of corporate 
wrongdoing may struggle to reconcile his duties to clients with his 
personal interest in obtaining whistleblower retaliation protection. 
For some whistleblowers, Somers created as many questions as it 
resolved. 
Mr. Bennett’s prizewinning Note ably wrestled with the 
complex issues raised by this case, and anticipated the Court’s 
unanimous holding. The Chevron issues that Mr. Bennett analyzed 
must await future cases. I congratulate Mr. Bennett for his 
excellent work. 
